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Many Hands: The Effect of Prior Inventor-Intermediaries Relationships on Academic Licensing  
 
HIGHLIGHT  
 Prior inventor-intermediaries relationship overcomes informational barriers and search costs to 
facilitate licensing of academic inventions.  
 Such a relationship is especially important before intellectual property protection is granted to an 
invention (high informational barriers).  
 Such a relationship is especially important when intermediaries lack buyer-side contacts (high 
search costs).
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Many Hands: The Effect of the Prior Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship on Academic 
Licensing  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
We study the role of the relationship among inventors and intermediaries in the licensing of university 
inventions. We suggest that a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship positively influences licensing 
rates through selective retention of higher quality relationships and mutual learning in the relationship, 
enabling intermediaries to reduce both information asymmetry and search costs between inventors and 
potential licensees. We argue that the influence of a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship on 
licensing is especially important before intellectual property protection is attained and can be substituted 
by the buyer-side contacts of inventors and intermediaries. We test these predictions using 919 
inventions from the technology transfer office at Stanford University. This study has implications for 
the policies and design of university technology licensing organizations. 
 
Keywords: Prior Relationship, Intermediaries, Licensing, Academic Science, Intellectual Property 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Due to its importance in achieving technological breakthroughs, the commercialization of 
academic science has received a growing amount of attention around the world (Buenstorf, 2009; Geuna 
and Nesta, 2006; Mowery et al., 2001; Motohashi, 2005; Motohashi and Yun, 2007; Sampat, 2006). A 
key component of this process of commercialization is the reliance of university inventors on 
intermediaries during their search for potential licensees (Clayton, Feldman, and Lowe, 2018). 
Typically, universities employ a specialized intermediary that is directly responsible for technology 
commercialization: the university technology licensing office (hereafter referred to as “TLO”) (Yusuf, 
2008). The TLO plays a pivotal role in commercializing university inventions by providing incentives 
to faculty for disclosing their inventions, coordinating the evaluation of inventions, marketing and 
licensing inventions, and monitoring license infringements (Bozeman, Rimes, and Youtie, 2015; 
Derrick, 2015; O’Kane et al., 2015; Siegel and Wright, 2015). Existing research has investigated various 
topics related to TLO outcomes, including TLO performance, productivity and efficiencies (Mowery et 
al., 2001; Siegel, Veugelers, and Wright, 2007; Thursby and Kemp, 2002); the organizational processes 
and routines of university technology commercialization (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003; Sampat and 
Nelson, 1999; Siegel, Waldman, and Link, 2003); and different types of TLO business models (Baglieri, 
Baldi, and Tucci, 2018; Sengupta and Ray, 2017).  
Across these various research streams, a recurring insight is the importance of the inventor-
TLO relationship for the commercialization of university inventions. When transaction costs are present 
and information asymmetry between inventors and potential licensees exists, inventor-TLO 
relationships can affect the valuation of an invention, how quickly patenting occurs, and the marketing 
of the invention (Thursby and Thursby, 2007; Kenny and Patton, 2009). Because university scientists 
and industry partners often have different motivations (Stern, 2004), TLOs help bridge the cognitive 
and organizational gaps between academia and industry partners (Villani, Rasmussen, and Grimaldi,  
2017). In the most effective inventor-TLO relationships, the TLO can facilitate a much more productive 
market search by lowering search and opportunity costs (Hellmann, 2007).   
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While theory has focused on inventor-TLO relationships, in practice, TLO professionals 
employ their technology marketing expertise alongside another intermediary: external patent agents 
(Sampat and Nelson, 1999). The TLO’s licensing professionals rely on external patent agents who also 
work with inventors to protect the university’s intellectual property (“IP” hereafter). Only recently have 
scholars turned their attention to the role of patent agents in technology commercialization. Lamoreaux 
and Sokoloff (2002) adopted a historical perspective to study patent agents in the early nineteenth 
century and suggested that inventors who shared a stable relationship with a patent agent were able to 
lower the search costs associated with licensing their inventions. To more deeply understand effective 
intermediation processes in technology transfer, we require both theoretical and empirical research on 
the concrete social relationships that occur among the multiple players in the intermediation linking 
university inventors to potential licensees (De Silva, Howells, and Meyer, 2018; Howells, 2006).  
In this paper, we focus on the relationship among inventors and two types of intermediaries—
TLO licensing managers and external patent agents—and investigate how an inventor’s relationship 
with intermediaries influences the technology licensing process. Specifically, we ask the following 
research questions: Do prior relationships among inventors and intermediaries influence technology 
licensing? If so, what are the boundary conditions that affect the relationship’s influence? By focusing 
on the relationship among inventors and multiple intermediaries, we move beyond a more simplified 
approach that treats the TLO as a unitary organizational actor.   
To address our questions, we draw on previous literature concerned with the impact of 
relationships on economic activity (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997) and literature discussing the 
influence of specialists on team coordination (Puranam, Singh, and Chaudhuri, 2009; Srikanth and 
Puranam, 2011) and innovation (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). We develop arguments that link the 
existence of a previous relationship among an inventor and intermediaries to the licensing of an 
invention. We conduct empirical tests using data from Stanford University’s TLO, one of the most 
successful offices in university-industry technology transfer (Mowery et al., 2001; Mitchell, 1991; 
Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003; Powell, Owen-Smith, and Colyvas, 2007). 
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Our study highlights the role of multiple intermediaries, specifically their concrete social 
relations that operate within the dynamics of innovation intermediaries. By doing so, we contribute to 
the existing literature in two ways. First, we supplement the current research on intermediaries by 
specifically investigating the relationship among inventors and their multiple intermediaries. The 
various functions of intermediaries in the market for technology have been separately documented 
(Benassi and Di Minin, 2009; Howells, 2006; Wagner, Hoils, and Thoma, 2014; Wright et al., 2008), 
but the influence of multiple-intermediary relationships on licensing remains to be explored. We argue 
that the inventor-intermediaries relationship may reduce information asymmetry and search costs and 
thus facilitate market matching between inventors and licensees; this complements studies on inventor-
buyer relationships in the market for technology (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2004). Second, we 
contribute to the literature on the market for technology by developing predictions regarding specific 
moderating conditions that amplify information asymmetry and search costs and thus influence the 
positive effect of a prior relationship on licensing. The first moderator is the change in IP rights 
protection that occurs as inventions move through the patent application and grant process. While 
previous literature suggests that increased IP protection may reduce market friction in licensing (Gans, 
Hsu, and Stern, 2008), the extent to which these two different mechanisms (prior relationships and IP 
rights) are either substitutes for or complements to each other has not been clear or systematically 
investigated. By examining how relationships and formal IP rights interact in the market for technology, 
our study helps us understand why the likelihood of licensing changes as inventions pass through the 
timeline of patent regimes. The second moderator we investigate is the buyer-side contacts of inventors 
and intermediaries. We test whether lower search costs for inventors and intermediaries with numerous 
buyer-side contacts enable substitution for a prior relationship in facilitating a successful licensing 
outcome.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1. Innovation intermediaries  
Innovation intermediaries are broadly defined as “organizations that provide a supportive role 
for collaboration between two or more parties during various stages of the innovation process” (De 
Silva et al., 2018, 70). Innovation intermediaries help to “provide information about potential 
collaborators, broker a transaction between two or more parties, act as a mediator, or go-between, bodies 
or organizations that are already collaborating, and help find advice, funding and support for the 
innovation outcomes of such collaborations” (Howells, 2006, 720). Recognizing innovation 
intermediaries as key actors in technological innovation, the literature discusses at length the different 
types of intermediaries (Clayton et al., 2018; Yusuf, 2008), their multiple functions (Howells, 2006; 
Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008) and their contributions to value creation (De Silva et al., 2018). Innovation 
intermediaries offer various services, such as evaluating, validating, protecting, and commercializing 
inventions and providing inventors with relevant and timely industry information (Howells, 2006, 720-
721). In so doing, innovation intermediaries are able to generate value for their collaboration partners 
by utilizing the knowledge vested in the innovation system (De Silva et al., 2018). A key role of 
innovation intermediaries is building relationships between entities to enable collaboration, contributing 
to the broader formation and evolution of value chains through technology development. Creating such 
network connections among relevant players is a key source of value creation that underlies all the 
contributions of innovation intermediaries. 
 
2.2. Innovation intermediaries in academic science commercialization 
The technology market for university inventions has expanded in recent decades. Extensive 
research on academic science licensing and commercialization has documented the growth of university 
technology licensing and its implications for faculty research (Thursby and Thursby, 2007), the 
academic output of inventors (Elfenbein, 2007), the productivity of university licensing and patenting 
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(Siegel et al., 2007), and the efficiency of university licensing (Thursby and Kemp, 2002). Empirical 
studies have also found that IP strength is important for the licensing of university inventions (Shane, 
2002) and the termination of a license (Dechenaux et al., 2008). 
Because inventors are typically research faculty who must manage research and teaching—and 
because academic inventors may not be intrinsically motivated to commercialize inventions (Stern, 
2004)—the role of specialized intermediaries is even more important in the case of university inventors. 
The importance of multifaceted intermediation, as well as the roles of various types of intermediaries, 
has been specifically recognized in the context of university-industry linkages (Clayton et al., 
2018;Yusuf, 2008; Gulbrandsen, Mowery, and Feldman, 2011; Siegel et al., 2001). In particular, the 
embryonic nature of academic inventions and their need for further development prior to 
commercialization leads to the need for patent protection and marketing to find an appropriate 
commercial partner (Thursby and Thursby, 2007). Thus, the literature on the university technology 
market identifies two substantive intermediation tasks: technology marketing and IP rights protection 
(Siegel et al., 2007).  
 
2.2.1 Licensing managers as a technology marketing intermediary  
Technology marketing includes evaluating the commercial potential of disclosed inventions, 
identifying potential buyers for the inventions, disseminating information to potential buyers, and 
brokering inventions to the commercial market. Technology marketing and the process of licensing are 
conducted by an important and specialized intermediary, the licensing manager who works in the 
university TLO (Clayton et al., 2018; Yusuf, 2008).1 These licensing managers serve as intermediaries 
and provide services that link university inventions to the public marketplace. Licensing managers play 
a pivotal role in evaluating inventions, working with commercial licensees, and monitoring 
infringements (Bozeman et al., 2015; Derrick, 2015; O’Kane et al., 2015; Siegel et al., 2008; Siegel and 
Wright, 2015; Wright et al., 2008).  
                                                          
1 In the U.S., the advent of the American Bahy-Dole Act in 1980, which enabled inventions with federal funding 
to be assigned to universities and commercialized, led to a surge of growth in TLOs and their transactions 
(Mowery et al., 2001). 
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2.2.2 Patent agents as an IP rights protecting intermediary 
Patent agents coordinate the legal activities necessary for IP protection by filing patent 
applications, submitting office actions in the (re)examination and revision of patent content, interacting 
with patent examiners, and negotiating the claims of the patent before the formal patent allowance, i.e. 
a regulatory event that confirms the claims made in a patent application. Recent literature has examined 
the influence of IP intermediaries on the licensing of inventions and the transfer of knowledge between 
organizations (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999; Lamoreaux, Sokoloff, and Sutthiphisal, 2013; Wagner 
et al., 2014). Patent attorneys link buyers to sellers and create network connections that enable market 
organization for patented technologies. It has also been shown that more productive inventors have 
stable relationships with patent attorneys (Lamoreaux et al., 2013). Evidence for the value of an IP 
intermediary is also found in work by Wagner, Hoisl, and Thoma (2014); the authors examined the role 
of patent agents as intermediaries and found that using an external patent agent increased both the 
sourcing of nonlocal knowledge and the patented invention’s effect.  
 
2.2.3 Joint role of patent agents and licensing managers 
The development of the market for university technology requires both technology marketing 
and patent protection together with the intense coordination of professional intermediaries who 
specialize in these activities. As these two tasks involve complementary, interactive processes, both 
licensing managers and patent agents collaborate a great deal with each other and with inventors. Both 
intermediaries need to utilize the inventors’ knowledge, as the inventors are likely to have the best 
understanding of which firms might be interested in an invention and play a vital role in the transfer of 
their technology (Kenny and Patton, 2009). Both technology marketing and patent prosecution are a 
relatively time-consuming process, taking two to five years before final licensing (Gans et al., 2008; 
Hegde and Luo, 2017) or patent issuance (Popp, Juhl, and Johnson, 2004; Schatz, 2009). Given the long 
time frame, the repetition of the inventor-intermediaries relationship depends on the availability of the 
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intermediaries, especially external patent agents, leading to great variation in the retention of the triad 
relationship among inventors, TLO licensing managers, and patent agents.  
 
2.2.4 Boundary conditions: Formal IP rights and buyer-side contacts 
 Because the process of technology marketing often occurs before a decision to file for patent 
protection, the marketing and patent application can run in parallel throughout the commercialization 
process (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003). It is often the case that some university inventions are licensed 
even before the filing of patent applications (Elfenbein, 2007). As such, the relationship may serve as 
an informal institutional arrangement that can substitute for formal IP rights. However, there has not 
been a specific test on the joint effects of the change in IP rights and the presence or absence of a 
relationship among inventors and intermediaries on the likelihood of technology licensing. In this paper, 
we explore the effect of the inventor-intermediaries relationship on licensing, as IP rights vary for 
inventions in various stages of preapplication, postapplication yet preallowance, and postallowance of 
patent rights. Furthermore, an intermediary’s knowledge about market opportunities may influence 
search costs and substitute the presence of a tie between the inventor and intermediaries, which is the 
second boundary condition we study.  
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1. Prior collaborations and the licensing of inventions 
Prior relationships among inventors and intermediaries may influence the licensing of academic 
science via two mechanisms. First, the presence of repeated relationships allows inventors and 
intermediaries to understand each other’s competencies and capabilities (Gulati, 1995). The 
relationships in which actors repeatedly re-engage may be selected because they are best suited for the 
task at hand, but this is hard for outsiders to discern (Sorenson and Waguespack, 2006). Hence, when a 
prior relationship is retained, it may be because it is positively associated with licensing. Furthermore, 
prior interactions may have led to the creation of an affective bond among the individuals (Granovetter, 
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1985), which can cause partners to share more information, especially private information that is not 
available to the market, and exert more effort to make the association a success (Uzzi, 1997). For these 
reasons, from a sociological perspective, we suggest that prior ties (in other words, the “selective 
retention” among inventors and intermediaries) may be positively related to licensing.  
Second, studies on coordination between specialists, particularly in knowledge-intensive 
contexts, suggest that prior collaboration leads to the development of “common ground.” Common 
ground is defined as the shared understanding needed to communicate results, methods, and the use of 
tools from different domains (Puranam et al., 2009). Common ground enables specialists from disparate 
domains to better coordinate their efforts, and research on organizational design provides evidence for 
this. Puranam, Singh, and Chaudhuri (2009) found that firms with patents in the same subclasses, a 
measure of common ground, did not engage in costly structural integration postmerger. In their study 
of 126 offshore projects, Srikanth and Puranam (2011) found that high levels of interdependence 
between local and offshore parts of a project lowered performance. However, if firms invested in tacit 
coordination practices, leading to the development of common ground, performance improved. More 
pertinent to this study is evidence regarding academic scientists whose inventions span different 
domains (Kotha, George, and Srikanth, 2013); the authors found the likelihood of an invention being 
licensed increased if inventors from disparate domains had worked together at least once before the 
focal project. Research on innovation also provides evidence that functional roles, such as product 
design and manufacturing processes, lead to faster product launches when carried out in a reciprocal 
and cooperative manner (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Reitzig and Puranam (2009) found that firms with 
cross-functional teams coordinated activities—such as the generation, utilization, and protection of 
inventions—better than firms without cross-functional teams, leading to more successful patent grants 
(albeit with diminishing returns at extremely high levels of coordination). Evidence supports the notion 
that specialists who have previously collaborated can better communicate new knowledge, both within 
their teams and to outsiders, than specialists who have not previously collaborated.  
In the presence of transaction costs and information asymmetry (Kenny and Patton, 2009), the 
inventor-intermediaries relationship becomes more important because there is imperfect information 
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for all parties regarding the value of an invention, time constraints for patenting and marketing, and 
bargaining between the inventor and prospective buyers. We suggest that prior collaboration among 
inventors and intermediaries can assist in the licensing of inventions in two ways: by reducing 
information asymmetry among inventors and licensees and reducing the search costs of finding 
licensees.  
In the context of our study, the patent agent provides inventor-specific IP knowledge, aiding 
the protection of the invention. For example, licensing managers may seek the assistance of patent 
agents to draft confidential disclosure agreements (CDAs) specific to the technology at hand and 
distribute these to potential licensees as part of the invention information. Patent agents who have a 
prior relationship with the inventor can articulate the IP protection strategy more coherently, thereby 
assuaging the concerns of potential licensee firms. Through these informal mechanisms, a relational 
patent agent can reduce the information asymmetry between inventors and potential licensees and thus 
facilitate technology licensing.  
In addition, the partner-specific knowledge that inventors and intermediaries share can reduce 
the search costs of finding licensees. The process of finding potential licensees requires the articulation 
of technological opportunities and tacit knowledge of the technology’s broader context. Intermediaries 
can acquire common ground with inventors and utilize the inventor-specific knowledge they gain. This 
increased understanding of inventors and their inventions enables intermediaries to expand the 
marketing list of potential licensees and direct effective market searches.  
Similarly, a licensing manager who has previously dealt with an inventor can convey inventor-
specific knowledge concerning the research domain and technological prospects of the focal invention 
to potential licensee firms. This type of knowledge is difficult to clearly communicate unless a prior 
relationship has been established. Licensing managers who have had a prior relationship with inventors 
may be able to search for potential licensees in a more targeted way, informed by their previous 
experience as to which particular firms may be interested in the invention. Hence, if inventors and 
intermediaries share a prior collaboration, the intermediaries are more likely to have better knowledge 
of the inventions, enabling them to target, communicate, and persuade potential licensee firms. 
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 Thus, by clarifying the IP rights of an invention and reducing the information asymmetry in the 
transaction—and by enabling better targeting of potential licensees, thereby reducing the licensor’s 
search cost—a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship can ultimately increase the likelihood that an 
invention will be licensed.  
H1: A prior inventor-intermediaries relationship (among inventors, patent agents, and 
licensing managers) is positively related to an increased likelihood of licensing. 
 
3.2. Formal patent rights and the relationship among an inventor and intermediaries 
 Patent allowance—a regulatory event that confirms the claims made in a patent application—
has been shown to improve the probability of licensing an invention by between 70 and 80 percent 
(Gans et al., 2008). The allowance of a patent for an invention reduces search costs and information 
asymmetry between inventors and licensee firms. Patent allowance lessens the risk of licensing, but 
inventors decide to attempt to license before the patent is issued (Gans et al., 2008; Elfenbein, 2007). 
However, entering into licensing negotiations without a patent can put both inventors and potential 
licensee firms at a disadvantage, as the technology risks being unduly appropriated or imitated. The 
patent application draft clarifies the boundaries of an invention and the claims inventors make regarding 
its novelty, and the tacit descriptions of the invention are reduced to a codified form. When a patent 
application provides codified knowledge, the need for intermediaries to convey tacit knowledge 
between inventors and potential licensees is reduced. The act of sufficiently detailing the technology, 
as required by law in a patent application, reduces information asymmetry between inventors and 
potential licensee firms (Besen and Raskind, 1991). This level of detail also allows for CDAs to be 
signed. Without a patent application, disclosed information is hard to codify in a CDA. Hence, most 
licensees are unwilling to sign a blanket CDA that may encroach on their right to pursue in-house 
research, particularly in their domain of expertise. However, once a patent application has been filed, a 
narrow CDA covering the specific invention can be drafted and may enable the market for licensing to 
flourish, even without the presence of intermediaries with a prior relationship to the inventor. 
In situations in which inventors and intermediaries share a prior relationship, the intermediaries 
have a deeper knowledge of the inventors’ research, and they can describe the invention to potential 
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licensees in better detail. However, when there is no prior relationship, more information asymmetry 
will exist, making it harder to draft a compelling marketing statement or target the highest-potential 
licensees. In this case, a patent application can greatly assist in marketing efforts. Thus, the filing of a 
patent application reduces the role of relational intermediaries in the transfer of tacit knowledge from 
inventors to licensees. As such, we predict the following:  
H2a: Before the codification of an invention in the form of a patent application, the positive 
relationship between a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship and the likelihood of 
licensing is strengthened. 
  
As an invention progresses from filing to the allowance of a patent, the strength of its IP rights 
improves (Besen and Raskind, 1991). Patent allowance clarifies the content and scope of the patent 
claim, reducing the need for relational intermediaries in the technology market. Regarding the extent of 
the improvement, the allowance of a patent should diminish the importance of a prior inventor-
intermediaries relationship (Gans et al., 2008), leading to hypothesis 2b:  
H2b: The allowance of a patent attenuates the positive relationship between a prior inventor-
intermediaries relationship and the likelihood of licensing. 
 
3.3. Substitution of the prior inventor-intermediaries relationship by buyer-side contacts 
Intermediaries play a crucial role when search costs and information asymmetry are high (Lamoreaux 
and Sokoloff, 1999). An intermediary who has extensive experience gains knowledge about the buyer-
side market. An experienced intermediary may also possess information regarding which inventions 
appeal to potential licensee firms. When inventors or intermediaries have extensive buyer-side contacts 
from prior experience, they have more knowledge regarding which licensee firms may be interested in 
the invention compared to those without buyer-side contacts (Kenny and Patton, 2009). Inventors and 
intermediaries with extensive buyer-side contacts thus depend less on prior relationships for information 
on potential licensee firms. As such, to the extent that search costs are reduced by the buyer-side 
contacts of the inventors or the intermediaries, we predict the following: 
H3: A higher number of buyer-side contacts held by intermediaries and inventors attenuates 
the positive relationship between a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship and the 
likelihood of licensing. 
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4. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The research site for this study was Stanford University’s TLO: Stanford Office of Technology 
Licensing (hereafter “OTL”). The Stanford OTL was founded in 1970. Until fiscal year 2016, this OTL 
generated approximately $1.9 billion in licensing income. The organizational procedures in the OTL 
include reporting university inventions, technology marketing and search, and appropriate IP protection 
for technology. The Stanford OTL has professionals who specialize in technology marketing and search 
(licensing managers). Patent agents are externally hired by OTL for patent application and prosecution 
of the selective inventions. Most TLOs rely on external patent agents for patent protection and patent 
application and prosecution on behalf of the TLO.  
 
4.1. Intermediaries: Licensing managers and patent agents 
Throughout the study period, the OTL employed between 6 and 21 licensing managers 
annually. The licensing managers handled all the inventions disclosed to the OTL by the university’s 
faculty, employees, and students. To accurately describe the organizational processes from invention 
disclosure to licensing at the OTL, we reviewed the relevant OTL document and conducted field 
interviews with six licensing managers at the OTL. According to our findings, once an invention is 
disclosed to the OTL, the licensing manager assigned to the invention decides whether it has sufficient 
potential for commercialization. A licensing manager typically has technical expertise in life sciences, 
physical sciences, or both. Inventors cannot choose which licensing manager handles their invention. 
Licensing managers are responsible for their portfolio of inventions throughout the process; in deciding 
to move the technology forward, the licensing manager assumes responsibility for facilitating the entire 
commercialization process.  
If the licensing manager decides to patent an invention, he or she contacts an external patent 
agent. A patent agent is required to have passed a United States Patent and Trademark Office (hereafter 
“USPTO”) examination. An agent (who may also be an attorney) will also possess a degree and has the 
legal, scientific, and technical qualifications necessary to file a patent application on behalf of the 
inventor. The USPTO maintains a register of agents who can represent inventors in the processing of a 
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patent application. The term “prosecution of a patent application” refers to all actions the patent agent 
undertakes on behalf of the inventors to secure a patent at the USPTO. These actions include drafting 
and revising the patent application and responding to the patent examiner’s inquiries. During our sample 
period, the OTL used external patent agents to process applications. The licensing managers select 
agents for each invention that is deemed worthy of patent protection2. The licensing managers ask the 
agents to provide a cost estimate for drafting and prosecuting the application and approve the estimate 
if it falls within the OTL guidelines3. Once an agent receives a contract to prosecute a patent application, 
he or she contacts the inventors and begins drafting the application. At this point, while continuing to 
facilitate the overall process, the licensing manager entrusts the patent agent with the minutia of the 
patent prosecution4. The licensing managers thus oversee the entire commercialization process, but their 
                                                          
2 Our interviews revealed that choosing a patent agent to prosecute an application is, according to one licensing 
manager, “100% the licensing manager’s decision. Each hire: a case-by-case basis… Each one of us hires 
whichever attorney we want. We talk to each other, which attorneys are good, but the decision is up to the 
manager.” 
3 It is important to note that neither the inventors nor the potential licensee firms can make decisions on the patent 
process. In our interviews, we asked licensing managers if the patent agents introduced potential licensees to them, 
as suggested by the literature on the role of patent agents (Lamoreaux et al., 2013). The licensing managers all 
responded in the negative. The licensing managers also all pointed to the OTL’s policy that a patent agent cannot 
concurrently work for the OTL or any of its licensees. For example, as one interviewee said,  
“We do have a few patent attorneys who do both licensing and patenting. But here, we never use the licensing 
capacity, the licensing experience of the patent attorney. I think we have a few practitioners who can do both, 
but we only use the patent prosecution experience of the patent attorney. I think people always rely on their 
own knowledge here, and the team knowledge, because people always exchange, people always have team 
meetings here two times a week, and anybody can say “I am talking to this company, and we are talking 
about the licensing terms. What do you think?” Then, everybody can say what they think. You don’t need a 
patent attorney.”  
This finding was reinforced in another interview: “We don’t use the patent attorneys for anything to do with 
licensing. ’Cause their expertise is writing a patent and not negotiating the license. …they don’t have any role in 
negotiating the license because that is not the area of their expertise. “ 
4 According to one licensing manager, “We usually leave most of the patenting process between the inventor and 
the patenting agent or the attorney patenting.” Licensing managers are science and business experts rather than 
legal experts, and they do not attend meetings between the inventors and their patent agents. Furthermore, the 
patent agents are instructed to work directly with the inventors. For example, in the engagement letter to patent 
agents, the OTL instructs, “The inventors of [name deleted] technologies should be copied on all incoming and 
outgoing patent mail. In the case of office actions, please communicate directly with the inventors unless otherwise 
stipulated.” In terms of responding to office actions (outcomes of the patent application examination) by the 
USPTO, the patent agents again had free reign on how to proceed, as one interviewee stated:  
“[Licensing managers] rely heavily on [patent agents] to give an opinion; the attorney to say, “I think, in 
response to this office action, we should do this.” We will look at it and agree or recommend something else. 
But honestly, in most cases, there is nothing that we would recommend. Whatever their opinion is, is the 
opinion that we would go forward with. In complicated cases, that is different. So, we trust them, we respect 
them and pay them good money, and so we hope that they are experts.” 
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focus is primarily on licensing, and inventors communicate directly with the agent who processes the 
patenting of their invention.  
As shown in Figure 1, our analysis of the research site revealed two parallel lines of action: 
licensing and patenting. Licensing can occur at any point following an invention’s disclosure. The 
licensing manager has control over the initiation of the licensing process, the types of licensees 
approached, and the initial terms of the agreement. In the patenting process, all applications proceed 
under the patent agent’s control once he or she has been hired. In due course, the patent agent will 
interview the inventors, draft the patent application, and file the application with the USPTO. The patent 
agent informs the licensing manager of progress. Thus, at our research site, patenting and licensing 
occur in two parallel streams. 
--INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE-- 
Our research site offers distinctive features that can accommodate our research questions. First, 
there is a natural turnover of intermediaries, particularly external patent agents, as they may shift firms 
or may not be available due to their workload. There is thus an empirical basis for estimating the effect 
of a prior relationship after controlling for prior success. Nevertheless, the effect of a prior relationship 
may be from selective retention and mutual learning. To the extent possible, we try to distinguish 
between the selection and learning effects in our methods by adopting a matched sample estimation 
strategy to reduce heterogeneity in the sample of inventions with and without a prior relationship. 
--INSERT FIGURES 2 & 3 HERE-- 
Second, we accurately observe the timing of the patenting and licensing process in our sample 
for all inventions, two separate processes coordinated by different professionals. There is a dynamic 
trade-off in the timing of the patenting and licensing process in which successful technology licensing 
often requires the prospect of patent protection of the technology, but an early licensing agreement 
enhances efficiency and reduces time-to-market (Gans et al., 2008). This trade-off in timing produces 
variation in the time-dependence between licensing and patenting for university inventions; some 
university inventions are licensed even before the filing of patent applications (Elfenbein, 2007). The 
drafting and filing of a patent application may take some time after the invention is disclosed, so it is 
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conceivable that licensing may occur even before a patent application has been filed. In our research 
context, nearly 29 percent of all licensed inventions were licensed before a patent application was filed 
(see Figure 1). Furthermore, a majority of the licensing occurred before the allowance of patent 
protection (78 percent, as shown in Figure 2). Therefore, there are three stages under which licensing 
may occur: prefiling of a patent application, postfiling of a patent application to preallowance of a 
patent, and postallowance of a patent. These stages enable us to examine the variation in the effect of 
an inventor-intermediaries relationship on licensing as an invention passes from one stage to another. 
 
4.2. Operationalization of the hypotheses 
In our research context, inventors must rely on two intermediaries for licensing their 
technology, a licensing manager and a patent agent, who specialize in marketing and IP protection, 
respectively. We define a prior relationship as having occurred when the inventor has worked with the 
same licensing manager and patent agent on a previous invention, a three-party relationship tie. In all 
our analyses, we control for the presence of dyadic ties between inventors, licensing managers, and 
patent agents. We account for the presence of these ties in a test of the prior relationships among 
inventors and intermediaries. Hence, we compare the cases in which there is no prior relationship 
between any of the parties with cases in which there is a prior relationship. The patent agents do not 
provide buyer-side contacts at our research site, so when we examined buyer-side contacts in hypothesis 
3, we limit the substitution tests to the prior buyer-side contacts of the licensing managers and inventors. 
We nevertheless also include the patent agent buyer-side as a control for the sake of caution. 
 
5. METHODS 
 
5.1. Sample 
We collected data in two waves. In 2009, we interviewed two senior managers of the Stanford 
OTL and collected data on information disclosures and licensing activity at the OTL. In 2014, we 
conducted interviews with four senior managers to gain a deeper understanding of the processes that 
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are relevant to the study and collected updated information on licensing. We started with 1,405 patent-
filed inventions disclosed to the OTL between 1981 and 2002. We took 1981 as the starting point for 
our analysis, as the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 altered the rules overseeing the ownership and licensing of 
federally funded academic research (Mowery et al., 2001). We observed the licensing of the patented 
inventions until August 31, 2009. We dropped 21 of the inventions due to long delays in patenting or 
licensing (over ten years), although including these inventions in the analysis did not change any of our 
results. We focused on the effect that a prior relationship among inventors and intermediaries has on 
licensing, so our analyses were necessarily concerned with inventors’ second and subsequent 
inventions. An inventor’s first invention, by definition, cannot have a prior relationship with 
intermediaries. Thus, dropping all first-time inventors from our sample left us with 919 second and 
subsequent inventions from 195 inventors.5 The mean number of inventions produced by an inventor 
was 9.24; the median was 5, with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 62.  
 
5.2. Dependent variable 
 The dependent variable of main interest to us was the licensing of inventions. Of the 919 
inventions analyzed, 587 (64 percent) were licensed on or before August 31, 2009. This licensing 
proportion compares favorably with other studies from similar highly rated TLOs. For example, in his 
study of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) TLO, Shane (2002) found that 52 percent of 
patented inventions were licensed. We observed all the inventions from the date of disclosure until 
nearly seven years after the end of our sample’s licensing window. Following convention, our 
dependent variable was coded with a value of 1 on the date an invention was licensed and remained so 
for rest of the sample period. If an invention was not licensed, it was coded as 0.  
 
5.3. Explanatory variables 
                                                          
5 In an unreported robustness analysis section, we followed the traditional format of using the entire sample and 
controlled for the inventor’s first invention with an indicator variable and then estimated the hazard of licensing 
using all the theory and control variables discussed above. We found identical results. 
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 Inventor-intermediaries relationship. Our key explanatory variable was the presence of a prior 
inventor-intermediaries relationship in the licensing of inventions.6 All inventions with two or more 
inventors have a lead inventor whose primary responsibility is to coordinate inventors and 
intermediaries. A lead inventor interacts with the two intermediaries: the licensing manager at the OTL 
and the chosen external patent agent. If the inventor had a previous invention handled by the same 
licensing manager and patent agent as for a subsequent focal invention, the explanatory variable took 
the value of 1; otherwise, it was coded as 0. We also included control variables distinguishing whether 
there was a prior dyadic relationship between the inventor, licensing manager, and patent agent. We 
describe these control variables in more detail in a later section. 
 IP regime change: Application filing and patent allowance. The second explanatory variable 
in our study was the official change in IP protection covering an invention. In our research context, 
inventions are likely to be licensed long before the allowance of a patent; in fact, some licenses are 
likely before any IP protection (i.e., before the patent application) (Elfenbein, 2007). Thus, we followed 
convention in classifying the IP regimes that cover an invention into three periods: prefiling of a patent 
application, postfiling of a patent application until patent allowance, and, finally, postallowance of a 
patent. The expectation was that an invention’s IP rights progressively strengthen as the invention 
moves through these stages (Besen and Raskind, 1991). We used two indicator variables—filing and 
allowance—to divide the sample time into the three periods. In the estimations, the prefiling period was 
the baseline, and the other two periods were compared against the baseline. Filing-to-allowance took a 
value of 1 on the date of a patent application filing until the date of the patent allowance. Postallowance 
                                                          
6 In academic science licensing, each instance of the working relationship is a relatively long process that requires 
endeavors of collaboration between the inventor and two intermediaries. This working relationship between 
inventor, licensing manager, and patent attorney take two to five year before the invention can be finally licensed. 
Considering this long-time horizon of working relationship, we believe that the distinction between having prior 
relationships versus no relationship provides the substantive difference in technology licensing. Thus, 
conceptually, our focus is to examine this qualitative difference between preexisting relationships and de novo 
relationships by distinguishing whether inventors return to two intermediaries and work with them again. 
Empirically, we checked the distribution of the count of prior relationships in the data and found that 54% of the 
cases belong to zero prior relationship and 32% of them belong to one prior relationship. Since the majority of 
prior relationships belong to either zero or one, we reason that the binary distinction captures a meaningful 
difference in the actual distribution of the data. Taken together, we suggest that the binary difference is a valid 
measure to estimate the effects of prior relationships. Hence, we present the results from using the binary variable 
of prior relationship in the main analyses. Then, we use the count variable of prior relationship in supplementary 
analyses, which produced consistent results (see Table 8).  
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took a value of 1 on the date a patent was allowed by the USPTO and remained so for the rest of the 
period. If the invention never received a patent allowance, it was coded as 0. When the two indicator 
variables were entered simultaneously in any estimation, the baseline to which they were compared was 
the period from the date of invention disclosure to the date of application filing. 
 Buyer-side contact. We measured the licensing manager’s buyer-side contacts by counting the 
unique licensee firms the licensing manager had signed an agreement with prior to the focal invention. 
We measured the inventor’s buyer-side contacts by counting the unique licensee firms the inventor’s 
prior inventions had been licensed to prior to the focal invention. 
 
5.4. Control variables 
 Inventor and intermediary experience. We measured inventor experience by counting the 
number of prior inventions the inventor had disclosed. Licensing manager experience was measured as 
a count of inventions the licensing manager had handled prior to the focal invention. Patent agent 
experience was measured similarly, with a count of the past patents granted to the patent agent prior to 
the focal invention. 
Commercial potential. We collected data on the commercial potential of the inventions as rated 
by licensing managers upon disclosure. The inventions were ranked on a scale from 1-3, with 3 
designating the inventions expected to have the highest commercial potential.  
Prior performance. In our setting, the most pertinent prior performance variable was prior 
licensing.7 Licensing is a better indicator of performance than patenting, as similar studies have found 
that in most cases, patents can be secured through persistent application attempts (Sampat and Lemley, 
2010; Gaudry 2012). Gaudry (2012) found that nearly 65 percent of patent applications using a patent 
agent are allowed. Of disallowed patent applications, nearly 75 percent are allowed on appeal (Werking, 
2012). Thus, there is consensus that for a determined inventor with deep pockets, a patent in one form 
or another is almost always available. Hence, our focus was on licensing as a measure of prior invention 
                                                          
7 For example, the head of the OTL clearly informs patent agents of the OTL’s priorities: 
“Our business is licensing technology, not just acquisition of patents. We are interested in obtaining 
broad licensable proprietary rights at a reasonable cost.” 
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success. The focal invention was coded as 1 if the focal inventor’s prior invention was licensed 
immediately prior to the disclosure of the focal invention. Otherwise, it was coded as 0. 
 Team size. We measured the size of an inventor team by the number of inventors working on 
the focal invention. 
 Prior dyadic relationships. We controlled for any prior dyadic relationships between inventors, 
licensing managers, and patent agents. If an inventor and a licensing manager had worked on a previous 
invention, then the Inventor-LM variable was given a value of 1; if not, it was coded as 0. If an inventor 
and a patent agent had worked on a previous invention, the Inventor-PA firm variable was coded as 1; 
if not, it was coded as 0. If a licensing manager and patent agent had worked on a previous invention, 
the LM-PA firm variable took a value of 1, and if they had not, the value was 0. With the three dyadic 
indicator variables in the estimation as controls, we compared the cases with no prior relationships 
between any of the three parties with the cases in which all three parties shared a prior relationship. 
Patent forward citations. We collected information on the forward citations each patented 
invention received until the end of 2013. These forward citations were measured as the count of other 
patents that had built on the focal invention’s patent. The count of forward citations is an ex post 
measure, but it has been widely used to control for the heterogeneity in the economic quality of 
inventions (Agrawal 2006; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002).   
Other patent-level measures. Linking a patent to its invention allowed us to control for 
differences in invention quality. These patent-level measures can be calculated only for patent-granted 
inventions. In our sample, 20 percent of the inventions had a patent application filed but were not 
granted a patent. We included an indicator variable, patent-not-granted, that was valued as 1 if the 
invention did not receive a patent. Restricting the analysis to the subsample of inventions that had 
received a patent by the end of the observation window yielded similar results for the theory variables.  
As Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008) stated, there is no consensus on how measures derived from a 
patent linked to an invention predict the licensing of an invention. However, we also controlled for 
patent-based measures in the inventions we analyzed. The measures were as follows: the number of 
patent classes assigned to the invention by the USPTO examiner, the number of claims made in a patent, 
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and the number of backward citations a patent made to other patents. Originality refers to the 
concentration of the backward citations a patent makes across patent classes. The term generality 
designates the concentration of forward citations a patent receives across patent classes. These are all 
widely used measures of invention-level heterogeneity. A more detailed explanation of each of these 
measures is available in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).  
 
5.5. Estimation strategy 
 Estimating the influence of prior relationships among inventors and intermediaries on licensing 
and exploring how changes in the IP regime may alter this effect produced three primary concerns. The 
first was potential endogeneity due to the return of better-performing intermediaries, the termination of 
poor-performing intermediaries, and the bias this may cause. The second concern was the heterogeneity 
between inventions and the parties involved due to differences in the previous work experience of 
licensing managers and patent agents. A final concern was the right-censoring of our observations, 
resulting from some of the inventions being licensed after our observation window closed. We offer 
more in-depth explanations of these problems and the solutions we used to reduce bias below. 
 Endogeneity: Intermediary change and matched sample. A set of inventors and intermediaries 
are subject to turnover, but successful prior relationships are, unsurprisingly, more likely to be repeated. 
Thus, a simple examination of the effect of a prior relationship on licensing performance would capture 
the ability of the party that helped achieve success. If unaccounted for, this effect would lead to an 
overattribution of the relationship’s effect. Hence, we accounted for ability by using control variables 
for prior performance and actor experience.  
Despite our controls, an ideal setting would allow relationships among inventors and 
intermediaries to be randomly terminated; this will rarely be the case in a nonexperimental setting, but 
our research site offered a number of advantages in this regard. First, external patent agents may not 
always be available when an invention is disclosed if they move between firms or have a heavy work 
commitment at the time of disclosure. We found that the inventors at the OTL were paired with a new 
patent agent 34 percent of the time. When a prior invention was successfully licensed before the focal 
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invention’s disclosure, 41 percent of the inventions were assigned a new patent agent, compared to 31 
percent when the prior invention was not licensed. Thus, we found evidence of churn in the patent 
agent-inventor relationship, regardless of previous outcomes. We also examined the percentage of 
turnover in the relationship between inventors and licensing managers. Here, the rate was much lower: 
only 20 percent of the inventions experienced a change. As discussed in our research context section, 
inventors cannot choose the licensing manager with whom they interact.  
To reduce the influence of invention-level heterogeneity and actor experience between 
inventions with prior inventor-intermediaries relationships and those without, we followed Singh and 
Agrawal’s (2011) advice by conducting a matched sample analysis. To conduct the analysis, we used 
the coarsened exact matching (CEM) technique introduced by Iacus, King, and Porro (2011). The 
literature on matching emphasizes that appropriate matching reduces endogeneity concerns. In our case, 
eliminating the difference between inventions with a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship and 
those without improved our ability to compare the two categories. The CEM technique enabled us to 
construct samples in which inventions were matched on important dimensions except for the presence 
of a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship in the treatment condition. 
We attempted to reduce endogeneity by using five covariates: 1) commercial potential, 2) 
inventor experience, 3) licensing manager experience, 4) patent agent experience, and 5) prior licensing 
performance, all previously defined. Our treatment variable was the presence of a prior relationship 
among an inventor, a licensing manager, and a patent agent. Of the 919 second and subsequent 
inventions, 511 were matched (233 with a prior relationship, 278 without a prior relationship). With 
this matching, the global imbalance measure, indicated by the L1 distance in the CEM algorithm 
(Blackwell et al., 2009), substantially decreased from 0.68 in the prematched sample to 0.51 in the 
postmatched sample. We also included all the control variables when testing the hypotheses to account 
for any residual heterogeneity after the post matching. We tested our hypotheses in both the full and 
matched sample. While the effect of prior relationships on licensing may be due to selection and 
learning in the full sample, the extent to which matching accounted for some of the selection concerns 
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and reduced the coefficient of prior relationships in the matched sample enabled us to test our 
mechanism of learning from a prior relationship. 
 Controls for invention heterogeneity. We used two variables to control for the economic 
potential of the invention: commercial potential and forward citations. The measure of forward citations 
is widely used, but it is an ex post measure, visible to analysts but not to those involved at the time of 
licensing. To improve this measure, we collected ratings of the inventions’ commercial potential from 
the licensing managers at the time they were disclosed. This additional measure enabled us to control 
for otherwise unobserved heterogeneity in invention quality. 
Fixed effects. We included the year the invention was disclosed and its domain in all our 
analyses to account for year- and domain-specific effects. Our robustness analyses included fixed 
effects for inventors, licensing managers, and patent agents to account for any unobserved, time-
invariant ability of the parties that may have influenced licensing potential.  
Right censoring: Survival analysis. To predict invention licensing, we observed an invention 
from the date of its disclosure until the end of the sample period on August 31, 2009, nearly seven years 
after the last invention was disclosed. Potential right-censoring may still occur due to the possibility 
that an invention could have been licensed after the end of the observation window, and analysts 
recommend survival analysis to account for this (Cleves et al., 2016; Kleinbaum and Klein, 2012). 
Using the survival model, we predicted the conditional probability or hazard rate of the incidence of 
invention licensing. The hazard rate of invention licensing is expressed as follows: 
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where h is the hazard of technology licensing for the focal invention at time t, Pr(.) is the probability of 
an event between times t and t+Δt given that the invention is in the sample at risk at time t, and x is a 
set of covariates in the estimation. 
We focused on the underlying process that leads to the distribution of licensing events along 
the time dimension—that is, the drivers of the distributional form of licensing hazard. We estimated the 
hazard rate using the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1972), a semiparametric event history 
Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship 
26 
 
 
model. The Cox model has an advantage over parametric models in that the relationship between 
covariates and the hazard rate may be estimated without having to assume the nature and shape of the 
baseline hazard rate. The Cox model is specified as: 
)exp()()( 0 Xthth   
where h0(t) is an unspecified baseline rate, and X is the vector of covariates. To estimate the model, we 
included all annual observations (spells) for an invention from disclosure date to licensing date, or to 
August 31, 2009.  
 An invention disclosed to the OTL is unlikely to be licensed instantly, so the hazard of 
licensing should increase early in the observation period. Inventions that have not been licensed after a 
certain amount of time may have a lower hazard of licensing. We checked whether the underlying 
distribution of the licensing hazard did indeed initially increase and then decrease and confirmed this 
pattern. We tested whether our results were sensitive to the specific parametric assumptions and found 
that they were robust to multiple distributional specifications. 
  To summarize, our research site—where there is turnover in patent agents and inventors cannot 
self-select—offered a starting place to investigate the effect of prior relationships among inventors and 
intermediaries on invention licensing. The site, along with the carefully matched sample, additional 
control variables, fixed effects, and survival analysis, enabled us to recover the influence of prior 
relationships and the substitution of such relationships on invention licensing to the extent that current 
methods permit. 
 
6. RESULTS 
 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics and bivariate correlations for the variables used in the 
analyses. We find that the bivariate correlations among the patent-related measures (such as the number 
of claims, the number of prior cites, generality and originality, and the indicator of no patent grant) are 
relatively high.  
---INSERT TABLE 1— 
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 We start with simple models with the inclusion of key variables. Thus, before we test our 
hypotheses using multivariate and matched sample analyses, we present bivariate results for the prior 
inventor-intermediaries relationship, hereafter referred to as the “prior tie” effect on the hazard of 
licensing in Table 2. We conduct a simple Cox regression of the licensing likelihood on the binary 
indicator of a prior tie. We find that when there is a prior tie, the hazard of licensing is 1.80 times greater 
than when there is no tie (p < 0.001; see Table 2). Next, we investigate whether the influence of the 
prior tie is conditional on the performance of any prior invention in Table 3. We run a Cox regression 
of the licensing likelihood on the binary indicator of a prior tie, another binary variable of whether the 
prior invention was licensed or not, and the cross-term of the two. We find that there is a significantly 
higher influence when the prior invention was successfully licensed (hazard = 4.49; p < 0.001; see Table 
3); nevertheless, even when the prior invention was not licensed, the retention of intermediaries 
positively influences the focal invention’s licensing hazard (hazard rate = 1.25; p = 0.030; see Table 3).  
---INSERT TABLES 2 & 3 HERE— 
We then use multivariate survival regressions and matched samples to control for heterogeneity 
in inventor, patent agent, and licensing manager experience and invention quality. To test our 
hypotheses, we use the full sample and the matched sample of second and subsequent inventions, as 
defined in the section detailing our estimation strategy. We report the results of our Cox survival models 
estimating the hazard of licensing in Table 4. In specifications 1-6, we report the estimations using the 
full sample. In specification 1, we present the controls and the main effect of a prior tie. In specification 
2, we add the interaction of the prior tie with the patent application and patent allowance. In 
specifications 3, 4, and 5, we add inventor, licensing manager, and patent agent fixed effects, 
respectively. In specification 6, we include all three fixed effects. In specifications 7 and 8, we repeat 
the specifications 1 and 2 variables, respectively, on a matched sample described in the estimation 
strategy.  
We find that the main effect of prior ties in specification 1 in Table 4 (b = 0.395; p = 0.037) is 
positive and significant. The result is consistent with our hypothesis 1, which predicted that prior ties 
would improve licensing probability. We suggest that this positive effect of a prior relationship in the 
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full sample can derive from two broad mechanisms: selectively retaining higher quality intermediaries 
and from the improved coordination that occurs from learning. To the extent that our CEM matching 
process accounts for the selective retention of better-suited intermediaries, then the estimations using 
the matched sample provided a test of the effect of relationships that come from the mechanism of 
improved coordination from learning in the relationship. Therefore, the coefficient of prior relationship 
in the matched sample can be an indicator of the learning effect mechanism. Thus, in the matched 
sample in specification 7 in Table 4, the main effect of the prior tie variable is positive but not significant 
(b = 0.173; p = 0.458). Thus, to the extent that the matched sample accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity related to the quality of inventor and intermediaries, the results of the full sample and the 
matched sample taken together suggest that the influence of a prior relationship on licensing is from the 
selective retention of higher quality intermediaries rather than from the learning effect in the 
relationship. Therefore, we find support for the “selective retention” mechanism of hypothesis 1.  
---INSERT TABLE 4 HERE— 
 We use specifications 2 (full sample) and 8 (matched sample) with the moderators to test 
hypotheses 2a and 2b. In the estimations in Table 4, we use the prefiling stage as a reference category 
and present the effects of the filing-to-allowance and postallowance stages. Thus, the effects of the 
filing-to-allowance and postallowance stages are referenced to the prefiling stage. Hypothesis 2a 
predicted that prior ties and patent applications act as substitutes for each other. This prediction is also 
supported, as the interaction between prior ties and patent application filing is negative and significant 
in both the full sample (specification 2: b = -0.982; p < 0.001) and the matched sample (specification 
8: b = -0.961; p = 0.002). Hypothesis 2b predicted that to the extent an invention’s IP rights improve 
from filing to allowance, the patent allowance substitutes for the role of a prior tie. Testing hypothesis 
2b requires estimating the effect of the postallowance stage compared to the filing-to-allowance stage. 
Thus, we rerun the same estimations with the filing-to-allowance stage as a reference category to test 
hypothesis 2b, i.e., compare the filing-to-allowance stage with the postallowance stage. This estimation 
is exactly the same as those in Table 4, with the only change in the reference category from prefiling to 
filing-to-allowance stages in estimating the patenting stage effects. When we use the filing-to-allowance 
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as a reference category in the patenting stage, the coefficient of the interaction term of the prior 
relationship and the postallowance variable is -0.123, which is not significant (p = 0.667). Thus, while 
patent allowance does substitute for a prior tie in the prefiling period (specification 8: b = -1.082; p = 
0.001 when using prefiling as a reference category), this does not occur once an application has been 
filed (b = -0.123; p = 0.667 when using filing-to-allowance as a reference category). Thus, hypothesis 
2b is not supported.  
We plot the results of the interaction using the Stata postestimation margins command (see 
Figure 4). The hazard of licensing with a prior tie is 2.64 times the baseline hazard of licensing before 
a patent application is filed. Once an application has been filed, using the same baseline, the hazard of 
licensing is 1.81 without a prior tie and 1.83 with a tie, indicating that there is an increase in the 
likelihood of licensing once a patent application has been filed. This result also suggests that the 
presence of a prior tie is less relevant once an application has been filed and that a patent application 
substantially substitutes for its effect on licensing. Rather, the results support the view that it is the filing 
of a patent application itself that causes a shift in the substitution of the prior tie effect, which persists 
through patent allowance. In our setting, patent filing appears to determine the majority of an 
invention’s IP rights. 
---INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE--- 
 We test hypothesis 3 in specification 1 (full sample) and specification 2 (matched sample) of 
Table 5 and introduce main effects and the interaction of buyer-side contacts (from both inventors and 
licensing managers) and prior ties. As predicted, in the full sample (specification 1), we find that the 
buyer-side ties of inventors (b = -0.005; p = 0.060) and licensing managers (b = -0.007; p = 0.001) act 
as substitutes for the role of a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship. In the matched sample 
(specification 2), we also find that the buyer-side ties of inventors (b = -0.012; p = 0.279) and licensing 
managers (b = -0.006; p = 0.086) act as substitutes for the role of a prior inventor-intermediaries 
relationship. However, only the ties of licensing managers are significant, providing partial support for 
hypothesis 3 in the matched sample. The comparison of the marginal effect of a prior tie on licensing 
provides relative hazards of licensing when the licensing manager’s buyer-side contact is low and high. 
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We find that when licensing managers have few buyer-side contacts (one standard deviation below the 
mean), the hazard of licensing an invention when there is a prior tie is 3.04 times larger than the baseline 
of licensing an invention without a prior tie. Using the same baseline, when licensing managers have 
more buyer-side connections (one standard deviation above the mean), the ratio for invention licensing 
is 2.64 with a prior tie and 1.11 without.8   
   ---INSERT TABLE 5 HERE— 
To summarize, a prior tie is much more important before filing a patent application and much 
less important after a patent application has been filed. In the next section, we explore additional 
analyses that test the robustness of our results and provide further evidence of their underlying 
mechanisms.  
 
7. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
7.1. Multicollinearity from multiple controls. 
To address the concern regarding multicollinearity problems in the above-described models 
that included all the variables, we run simple models that include only key independent variables in 
Table 6. In Table 6, we run Cox regressions of invention licensing with a set of hypothesized variables 
from M1 to M5. We control only for the possible heterogeneity across technological fields and historical 
periods by including the fixed effects for technological domains and disclosure years as well as other 
relationship variables, i.e., three dyad relationships including an inventor-licensing manager tie, an 
inventor-patent agent tie, and a licensing manager-patent agent tie. In specification 1 of Table 6, we add 
a key independent variable of a prior tie among inventor, licensing manager and patent agent, which is 
                                                          
8 We set the baseline hazard, i.e., the hazard when the licensing manager’s buyer-side contact is one standard 
deviation below the mean (= 7.8) and there is no prior tie (= 0), as one. Then, we calculate the relative hazards 
of the other three cases. First, the relative hazard of licensing is 3.04 when the licensing manager’s buyer-side 
contact is one standard deviation below the mean (= 7.8) and there is a prior tie (= 1). Second, the relative 
hazard of licensing is 1.11 when the licensing manager’s buyer-side contact is one standard deviation above the 
mean (= 103.8) and there is no prior tie(= 0). Third, the relative hazard of licensing is 2.64 when the licensing 
manager’s buyer-side contact is one standard deviation above the mean (= 103.8) and there is a prior tie (= 1). 
We use the post-estimation margins command in Stata 13 after running the Cox regression model based on 
specification 2 of Table 5. 
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significant and positive (b = 0.399; p = 0.000). After introducing the moderating variables in 
specification 2, we add the interaction term between a prior tie and the patent stage variables in 
specification 3 to simply test hypotheses 2a and 2b. In specification 4 of Table 6, we add the interaction 
term between buyer-side contacts (from both inventors and licensing managers) and prior ties to test 
hypothesis 3. Then, in specification 5, we include all the hypothesized variables together. Throughout 
the specifications of Table 6, the coefficients of our hypothesized variables are all significant, which is 
quite consistent with the findings in the fully specified models of Tables 4 and 5. 
   ---INSERT TABLE 6 HERE— 
 
7.2. Does a buyer relationship act as a substitute for an inventor-intermediaries relationship? 
We test whether an inventor-licensee tie offsets an inventor-intermediaries tie using the 
estimation strategy pioneered by Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008, 991). The date of patent allowance is not 
under the control of the licensee or licensor, so it is randomly distributed and thus an excellent causal 
identifier of why some inventions are licensed early and others later. However, in our setting, the timing 
of patent application filing may be endogenous. After checking to see whether patent applications are 
filed earlier when inventors have prior ties, we find that once an invention is disclosed, there is no 
difference in the time it takes to file a patent application. Inventions with a prior tie take 185 days from 
disclosure to application filing, while inventions without a prior tie take 196 days (p = 0.4469). 
We also use Cox regression estimations, as shown in Table 7. First, we check that for inventors 
with a previously licensed invention, a returning licensee would create a lower need for a prior inventor-
intermediaries relationship to encourage licensing. Our results in specification 5 of the matched sample 
in Table 7 reveal that having a returning licensee does, in fact, enable inventors to license their 
inventions earlier than first-time inventors (b = 0.497; p = 0.012). Similarly, licensing also occurs earlier 
for repeat inventors when there is a prior inventor-intermediaries tie (b = 0.536; p = 0.061). However, 
we find that an inventor-licensee relationship does not substitute for an inventor-intermediaries 
relationship (b = 0.333; p = 0.264). Second, we find mixed results regarding whether patent rights 
substitute for prior inventor-licensee ties. In specification 6 of Table 7, when a patent is allowed, it 
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reduces the importance of prior inventor-licensee relationships (b = -0.758; p = 0.028). To summarize, 
these estimations confirm that a prior inventor-intermediaries tie is different from an inventor-licensee 
tie in technology licensing. 
 ---INSERT TABLE 7 HERE— 
 
7.3. The extent of prior experience 
 We replace the indicator variable for prior inventor-intermediaries experience with the count 
of prior experience and check whether the results hold. The results from the count variable are very 
consistent with those observed when we used a binary variable (see Table 8).  
---INSERT TABLE 8 HERE— 
To summarize, our results and additional analyses reveal a consistent pattern: prior ties among 
inventors and intermediaries matter. However, the most interesting results show the marked difference 
in the effect of prior ties before and after a patent application has been filed. Similarly, substituting the 
effect of prior ties with intermediaries’ buyer-side contacts is consistent with the underlying mechanism 
that results in prior ties positively influencing licensing.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
 Together with formal regulatory mechanisms, informal mechanisms such as prior relationships 
may help organize the licensing of technology in markets beset with information asymmetry and 
behavioral concerns (Arora et al., 2004). We found that the importance of prior relationships among 
inventors and intermediaries is markedly higher in the early days of an invention before formal IP 
regime coverage has commenced. The results of the hypotheses and the additional analysis suggest that 
there are two mechanisms through which a prior tie influences licensing. First, as evidenced by the 
substitution of a prior tie’s positive influence on patent application filing, information asymmetry can 
be reduced. Second, the substitution of the prior tie’s effect by the buyer-side connections of the 
inventor and the licensing manager demonstrates that search costs can be reduced. By identifying the 
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factors that can substitute for the role of a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship, we are able to 
provide evidence consistent with the causal arguments of improved coordination and buyer-side 
connections that underlie the prior relationship effect. 
This research contributes to the literature on intermediaries by documenting the role of multiple 
intermediaries and their relationships with inventors in the technology market. In examining the 
inventor-intermediaries working relationship, we investigate the relationship among the inventor and 
the two important intermediaries (licensing managers and patent agents) who work in concert to achieve 
technology licensing. The coupled relationship between the two key intermediaries, as well as with 
inventors, assists active and multifaceted intermediation for knowledge sharing and commercialization 
given that the knowledge is tacit or uncodified (Yusuf, 2008). This research identified the value of 
coupled intermediary agents’ relational function and their multifaceted intermediation services, which 
serve as useful routes for creating effective communication and thus smoothly conveying inventor-
specific tacit knowledge to potential licensee firms.   
Our focus on the individual intermediary’s relational dynamics presents a potential alternative 
mechanism for the functioning of the technology market (Arora et al., 2004; Gans and Stern, 2003). On 
the one hand, the previous literature emphasizes the legal mechanisms of formal IP protection in 
creating technology markets, i.e., the specialization and division of labor between technology suppliers 
and licensee firms (Arora and Merges, 2004). In the context of technology-based collaboration, patent 
protection can provide a formal mechanism that reduces the uncertainty of “probabilistic patent” and 
alleviates information asymmetry and the search cost of both sellers and buyers (Gans et al., 2008). On 
the other hand, emerging literature has examined the influence of intermediaries on the transfer of 
knowledge between organizations (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999; Lamoreaux et al., 2013; Wagner et 
al., 2014). Combining these two streams of literature, our study suggests that the existence of 
intermediary agents’ relational function and their intermediation services provide an alternative 
mechanism for formal IP protection in reducing market imperfection and enabling technology 
collaboration in the market. An intermediary’s relationships are useful routes for creating effective 
communication and thus smoothly conveying upstream-specific tacit knowledge to potential licensee 
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firms. Thus, the intermediary’s relationship building can create effective interpersonal information 
flows that connect upstream science and downstream markets by removing barriers to mutual 
collaborative prospects.    
 Another point established from our additional analysis is the differences in an inventor-
intermediaries tie when compared to an inventor-buyer tie. The inventor-intermediaries tie is more 
effective before a patent application is filed, and filing for a patent substitutes its effect. This result is 
consistent with the evidence of Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008), albeit with much cruder geographical 
indicators, and the presupposition that a relationship between the inventor and buyer exists. We are thus 
able to replicate the results from a previous study with a better measure and break new ground 
concerning the importance of inventor-intermediaries ties for licensing. Our results also show that an 
inventor-buyer tie does not substitute for an inventor-intermediaries tie. Hence, nurturing the inventor-
intermediaries tie may be more important, as there are fewer substitutes for its influence. Finally, a 
simple endogenous cycle of retaining successful intermediaries while changing unsuccessful 
intermediaries cannot explain our results. It is the unexpected loss of a patent agent, particularly 
following successful prior licensing, that leads to a reduced likelihood of licensing the focal invention. 
 
8.1. Implications for the design of TLOs 
 While churn is inevitable in any intermediary relationship, the cost of churn may be especially 
detrimental for TLOs that try to license in weak IP rights regimes, as our results show that licensing 
before filing is heavily contingent on the existence of a prior relationship among the inventor and the 
intermediaries. TLOs in weak IP rights regimes could, therefore, consider bearing the additional cost of 
housing patent agents within the organization rather than relying solely on external patent agents who 
may be unavailable. If the fixed cost of integrating patent agents in the TLOs is too high given a lower 
volume of inventions, then perhaps such TLOs could focus their attention on improving their screening 
process for patent agents. 
Because licensing takes an average of nearly 23 months in our sample, providing only high-
powered licensing-based incentives to licensing managers may lead to greater churn. TLOs may 
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consider providing licensing managers with multiple parameters to optimize, such as inventor 
satisfaction, the number of marketing initiatives, and the number of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) 
signed, rather than a simple count of licenses signed. Such multiattribute goals for licensing managers 
may better allow licensing managers to develop the ecosystem and reduce churn in the inventor-
intermediaries relationship. 
 
8.3. Implications for inventors 
From a practical point of view, our results enable us to advise inventors. In the U.S., using an 
external patent agent is the norm, so it is advisable for inventors and their organizations to initiate action 
early so that patent agents can be kept available for subsequent work. There is also a clear shift in the 
influence of licensing between filing and prefiling. Inventors who seek to license their inventions before 
a patent application has been filed are advised to focus on licensees they have dealt with before and 
attempt to secure the same patent agent they have previously used. 
 
8.4. Limitations 
 This study is not without limitations. First, there is the issue of the generalizability of our 
findings. Stanford University, an elite private university in the U.S., has been very active and successful 
in many aspects of technology commercialization. Specifically, Stanford’s regional environment, 
surrounded by high-tech companies and entrepreneurial ecosystems, is unique in facilitating successful 
university-industry technology transfer (Powell et al., 2007). While we believe that the conceptual 
mechanism of the inventor-intermediaries relationship may have its own merit regardless of a specific 
empirical setting, we acknowledge that the generalizability of our empirical findings is limited because 
it is based on a single university study. Future research may explore the possibility that the conceptual 
mechanisms presented in this paper can be applied to other university settings.   
 Related to the generalizability issue, we find that a majority of inventions in our setting were 
licensed before patent allowance, similar to the Harvard sample (Elfenbein, 2007); this may not always 
be the case in other markets, so our results may not be broadly applicable. We demonstrate how changes 
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in an IP regime influence licensing in conjunction with a prior inventor-intermediaries relationship, so 
some of the concerns about applying our findings to other domains are addressed. There is a growing 
trend across all innovation domains to increase the time to patent allowance, so more inventors may 
seek to license their inventions before patent allowance rather than risk obsolescence as they wait. 
Future research may examine the extent to which the variation in the time-dependence between the 
patenting and licensing processes affects the importance of the inventor-intermediaries relationship. 
Another limitation is that our research has a narrow focus on technology licensing amid the 
diverse spectrum of university-industry interactions. While academic science commercialization is an 
important component in university-industry linkages, the actual practices of university-industry 
knowledge transfer can include alternative forms of academic engagements such as collaborative 
research, consulting, and informal relationships (Perkmann et al., 2013; Tartari, Perkmann, and Salter,  
2014). Across such a wide spectrum of university-industry interactions, there can be different types of 
intermediation mechanisms in assisting universities in transferring knowledge and aiding the process 
of innovation (Gulbrandesen et al., 2011; Yusuf, 2008). Further research may explore the wide spectrum 
of university-industry linkages and different types of knowledge spillovers beyond academic science 
commercialization through technology licensing.  
  To summarize, in licensing markets in which the use of an external intermediary such as a 
patent agent is the norm, understanding how and when this relationship influences licensing is 
important. The results of our study suggest that the relationship among inventors and intermediaries has 
a positive effect on licensing outcomes. This effect is much stronger when IP protection is absent 
(during a patent’s prefiling stages) or weak (before a patent is allowed). This effect also strengthens 
when intermediaries lack contacts with potential licensee firms.  
  
Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship 
37 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Agrawal, A., 2006. Engaging the inventor: exploring licensing strategies for university inventions and 
the role of latent knowledge. Strategic Management Journal 27(1), 63-79. 
Ali, A., Gittelman, M., 2016. Research paradigms and useful inventions in medicine: patents and 
licensing by teams of clinical and basic scientists in Academic Medical Centers. Research 
Policy 45(8), 1499-1511. 
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., Gambardella, A., 2004.  Markets for Technology: the economics of innovation 
and corporate strategy. MIT press. 
Arora, A., Merges, R. P. 2004. Specialized supply firms, property rights and firm boundaries. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(3): 451-475. 
Arrow, K., 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity: economic and social factors. Princeton University Press, 609-
626. 
Baglieri, D., Baldi, F., Tucci, C. L., 2018. University technology transfer office business models: one 
size does not fit all. Technovation (in press) 
Benassi, M, Di Minin, A., 2009. Playing in between: patent brokers in markets for technology. R&D 
Management 39(1), 68-86. 
Bercovitz, J., Feldman, M., 2011. The mechanisms of collaboration in inventive teams: composition, 
social networks, and geography. Research Policy 40(1), 81-93. 
Besen, S.M., Raskind, L.J., 1991. An introduction to the law and economics of intellectual 
property. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), 3-27. 
Blakwell, M., Iacus, S., King, G.,  Porro, G., 2009. cem: Coarsened exact matching in Stata. The Stata 
Journal, 9(4), 524-546.  
Bozeman, B., Rimes, H., Youtie, J., 2015. The evolving state-of-the-art in technology transfer 
research: Revisiting the contingent effectiveness model. Research Policy 44(1), 34-49. 
Buenstorf, G., 2009. Is commercialization good or bad for science? Individual-level evidence from the 
Max Planck Society. Research Policy 38(2), 281-292. 
Clark, K.B., Fujimoto, T., 1991. Product Development Performance: Strategy, Organization and 
Management in the World Auto Industry. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Clayton, P., Feldman, M., & Lowe, N., 2018. Behind the Scenes: intermediary organizations that 
facilitate science commercialization through entrepreneurship. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 32(1), 104-124. 
Cleves, A.C., Gould, W.W., Gutierrez, R.G., Marchenko, Y., 2016. Parametric models. An 
Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata. Stata Press, 197-292. 
Cox, D.R., 1972. Regression Models and Life-tables (with discussion). Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society 34,187-220. 
De Silva, M., Howells, J., Meyer, M., 2018. Innovation intermediaries and collaboration: knowledge–
based practices and internal value creation. Research Policy, 47(1), 70-87. 
Dechenaux, E., Goldfarb, B., Shane, S., Thursby, M., 2008. Appropriability and Commercialization: 
evidence from MIT inventions. Management Science, 54(5), 893-906. 
Derrick, G., 2015. Integration versus separation: structure and strategies of the technology transfer 
office (TTO) in medical research organizations. The Journal of Technology Transfer 40(1), 
105-122. 
Elfenbein, D.W., 2007. Publications, patents, and the market for university inventions. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 63(4), 688-715. 
Gans, J.S., Hsu, D.H., Stern, S., 2008. The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the 
market for ideas: Evidence from patent grant delays. Management Science 54(5), 982-997. 
Gans, J. S., Stern, S. 2003. The product market and the market for "ideas": commercialization 
strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research Policy 32, 333-350. 
Gaudry, K.S., 2012. The lone inventor: Low success rates and common errors associated with pro-se 
patent applications. PloS One 7(3), e33141. 
Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship 
38 
 
 
George, G., 2005. Learning to be capable: patenting and licensing at the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation 1925–2002. Industrial and Corporate Change 14(1), 119-151. 
Geuna, A., Nesta, L. J. J., 2006. University patenting and its effects on academic research: the 
emerging European evidence. Research Policy 35(6), 790-807. 
Granovetter, M.S., 1985. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology 91(3), 481-510. 
Gulati, R., 1995. Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual 
Choice in Alliances. Academy of Management Journal 38(1), 85-112. 
Gulbrandsen, M., Mowery, D., Feldman, M., 2011. Introduction to the special section: heterogeneity 
and university-industry relations. Research Policy, 40(1), 1-5. 
Hall, B.H., Jaffe, A.B., Trajtenberg, M., 2001. The NBER patent citation data file: lessons, insights 
and methodological tools (No. w8498). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hegde, D., Luo, H. 2017. Patent publication and the market for ideas. Management Science, 64(2): 
652-672. 
Hellmann, T., 2007. The role of patents for bridging the science to market gap. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 63(4), 624-647. 
Howells, J., 2006. Intermediation and the role of intermediaries in innovation. Research Policy 35, 
715-728. 
Iacus, S.M., King, G., Porro, G., 2011. Causal inference without balance checking: coarsened exact 
matching. Political Analysis 20(1), 1-24. 
Kenney, M., Patton, D., 2009. Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the current university invention 
ownership model. Research Policy, 38(9), 1407-1422. 
Kleinbaum, D.G., Klein, M., 2012. Evaluating the proportional hazards assumption. Survival 
Analysis (Springer, New York), 161-200. 
Klerkx, L., Leeuwis, C., 2008. Balancing multiple interests: embedding innovation intermediation in 
the agricultural knowledge infrastructure. Technovation, 28(6), 364-378. 
Kotha, R., George, G., Srikanth, K., 2013. Bridging the mutual knowledge gap: coordination and the 
commercialization of university science. Academy of Management Journal 56(2):, 498-524. 
Lamoreaux, N.R., Sokoloff, K.L., 1999. Inventors, firms, and the market for technology in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and 
Countries. University of Chicago Press, 19-60. 
Lamoreaux, N.R., Sokoloff, K.L., 2002. Intermediaries in the US Market for Technology, 1870-
1920 (No. w9017). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Lamoreaux, N.R., Sokoloff, K.L., Sutthiphisal, D., 2013. Patent alchemy: the market for technology 
in US history. Business History Review 87(01), 3-38. 
Mitchell, W., 1991. Using academic technology: transfer methods and licensing incidence in the 
commercialization of American diagnostic imaging equipment research, 1954–1988. 
Research Policy 20(3), 203-216. 
Motohashi, K., 2005. University–industry collaborations in Japan: the role of new technology-based 
firms in transforming the National Innovation System. Research Policy 34(5), 583-594. 
Motohashi, K., Yun, X., 2007. China's innovation system reform and growing industry and science 
linkages. Research Policy 36(8), 1251-1260. 
Mowery, D. C., Ziedonis, A. A., 2015. Markets versus spillovers in outflows of university research. 
Research Policy 44(1), 50-66. 
Mowery, D.C., Nelson, R.R., Sampat, B.N., Ziedonis, A.A., 2001. The growth of patenting and 
licensing by US universities: an assessment of the effects of the Bayh–Dole act of 
1980. Research Policy 30(1):, 99-119. 
Mowery, D.C., Ziedonis, A.A., 2002. Academic patent quality and quantity before and after the 
Bayh–Dole act in the United States. Research Policy 31(3), 399-418. 
O’Kane, C., Mangematin, V., Geoghegan, W., Fitzgerald, C., 2015. University technology transfer 
offices: the search for identity to build legitimacy. Research Policy, 44(2), 421-437. 
Owen-Smith, J., Powell, W. W., 2003. The expanding role of university patenting in the life sciences: 
assessing the importance of experience and connectivity. Research Policy, 32(9), 1695-1711. 
Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship 
39 
 
 
Perkmann, M., Tartari, V., McKelvey, M., Autio, E., Broström, A., D’Este, P., Fini, R., Geuna, A., 
Grimaldi, R., Hughes, A., 2013. Academic engagement and commercialisation: a review of 
the literature on university–industry relations. Research policy, 42(2), 423-442. 
Popp, D., Juhl, T., Johnson, D. K., 2004. Time in purgatory: examining the grant lag for US patent 
applications. Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, 4(1). 
Powell, W. W., Owen-Smith, J., Colyvas, J. A. 2007. Innovation and Emulation: Lessons from 
American Universities in Selling Private Rights to Public Knowledge. Minerva, 45(2): 121-
142. 
Puranam, P., Singh, H., Chaudhuri, S., 2009. Integrating acquired capabilities: when structural 
integration is (un) necessary. Organization Science 20(2), 313-328. 
Reitzig, M., Puranam, P., 2009. Value appropriation as an organizational capability: the case of IP 
protection through patents. Strategic Management Journal 30(7), 765-789. 
Reitzig, M., Wagner, S., 2010. The hidden costs of outsourcing: Evidence from patent data. Strategic 
Management Journal 31(11), 1183-1201. 
Sampat, B. N., 2006. Patenting and US academic research in the 20th century: the world before and 
after Bayh-Dole. Research Policy 35(6), 772-789.  
Sampat, B. N., Nelson, R. R., 1999. The Emergence and Standardization of University Technology 
Transfer Offices: a case study of institutional change. . In 3rd Ann. Conf. Internat. Soc. New 
Institut. Econom. Washington, DC. 
Sampat, B.N., Lemley, M.A., 2010. Examining patent examination. Stanford Technology Law 
Review 2010, 2-34.  
Schatz, A., 2009. New chief of patent office takes aim at a massive backlog. Wall Street Journal (Oct 
10), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125513250890977347. 
Sengupta, A., Ray, A. S., 2017. Choice of Structure, Business Model and Portfolio: organizational 
models of knowledge transfer offices in British universities. British Journal of Management, 
28(4), 687-710. 
Shane, S., 2002. Selling university technology: patterns from MIT. Management Science 48(1), 122-
137. 
Siegel, D. S., Thursby, J. G., Thursby, M. C., Ziedonis, A. A., 2001. Organizational Issues in 
University-Industry Technology Transfer: an overview of the symposium issue. Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 26(1-2), 5. 
Siegel, D. S., Veugelers, R., Wright, M., 2007. Technology transfer offices and commercialization of 
university intellectual property: performance and policy implications. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 23(4), 640-660. 
Siegel, D. S., Waldman, D., Link, A., 2003. Assessing the impact of organizational practices on the 
relative productivity of university technology transfer offices: an exploratory study. Research 
Policy 32(1), 27-48. 
Siegel, D. S., Wright, M., 2015. University technology transfer offices, licensing, and start-ups. In A. 
N. Link, D. Siegel, M. Wright (Eds.), The Chicago Handbook of University Technology 
Transfer and Academic Entrepreneurship: 1-40. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Siegel, D., Wright, M., Chapple, W., Lockett, A., 2008. Assessing the relative performance of 
university technology transfer in the US and the UK: A stochastic distance function approach. 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 17(7-8), 717-729. 
Singh, J., Agrawal, A., 2011. Recruiting for ideas: how firms exploit the prior inventions of new 
hires. Management Science 57(1), 129-150. 
Sorenson, O., Waguespack, D. M., 2006. Social structure and exchange: self-confirming dynamics in 
Hollywood. Administrative Science Quarterly 51(4), 560-589. 
Srikanth, K., Puranam P., 2011. Integrating distributed work: comparing task design, communication, 
and tacit coordination mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal 32(8), 849-875. 
Stern, S., 2004. Do scientists pay to be scientists? Management Science 50(6), 835-853. 
Tartari, V., Perkmann, M., Salter, A., 2014. In good company: the influence of peers on industry 
engagement by academic scientists. Research Policy 43(7), 1189-1203. 
Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship 
40 
 
 
Thursby, J. G., Kemp, S., 2002. Growth and productive efficiency of university intellectual property 
licensing. Research Policy, 31(1), 109-124. 
Thursby, J. G., Thursby, M. C., 2007. University licensing. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
23(4), 620-639. 
Uzzi, B., 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: the paradox of 
embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(1), 35-67. 
Villani, E., Rasmussen, E., Grimaldi, R., 2017. How intermediary organizations facilitate university–
industry technology transfer: a proximity approach. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 114, 86-102. 
Wagner, S., Hoisl, K., Thoma, G., 2014. Overcoming localization of knowledge—the role of 
professional service firms. Strategic Management Journal 35(11), 1671-1688. 
Werking, K., 2012. 75%- The real rate of patent applicant success on appeal. IP Watch Dog. Accessed 
November 7, 2017. http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/05/02/75-the-real-rate-of-patent-
applicant-success-on-appeal/id=24525/. 
Wright, M., Clarysse, B., Lockett, A., Knockaert, M., 2008. Mid-range universities’ linkages with 
industry: Knowledge types and the role of intermediaries. Research Policy 37(8), 1205-1223. 
Yusuf, S., 2008. Intermediating knowledge exchange between universities and businesses. Research 
Policy, 37(8): 1167-1174. 
Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship 
41 
 
 
Figure 1: Organization of Licensing and Patenting at the Research Site 
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Figure 2: Licensing Prior to the Filing of a Patent Application 
 
 
Figure 3: Licensing Prior to the Allowance of a Patent 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
  
  
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Licensed 0.23 0.42
2 # of inventors 2.54 1.09 0.01
3 IV # of inventions 4.15 4.35 0.00 0.09
4 LM # of inventions 56.69 44.48 -0.07 0.14 0.25
5 PA # of patents 38.42 121.38 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.20
6 Prior licensing 0.54 0.50 0.18 -0.18 -0.05 -0.14 0.06
7 # of patent class 0.79 0.54 0.08 0.04 -0.05 -0.26 -0.16 -0.06
8 # of claims 15.20 17.85 0.06 0.12 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.56
9 # of prior cites 4.79 7.00 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.41 0.46
10 Generality 0.51 0.32 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.11 0.07 0.54 0.36 0.26
11 Originality 0.50 0.34 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.51 0.34 0.28 0.62
12 Inventions forward citations 1.35 1.40 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.16 -0.01 0.50 0.32 0.24 0.42
13 Patent-not-granted 0.18 0.38 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.13 -0.03 -0.68 -0.39 -0.32 -0.74
14 Commercial potential 1.32 0.85 0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.12 0.04 -0.03 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.17
15 Filing-to-allowance 0.30 0.46 0.18 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.23 0.11 0.10 0.25
16 Post-allowance 0.37 0.48 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09
17 Inventor's buyer-side contact 1.66 18.16 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08
18 LM's buyer-side contact 55.79 47.98 -0.05 0.12 0.11 0.71 0.11 -0.10 -0.17 0.03 0.04 -0.09
19 PA's buyer-side contact 9.24 21.90 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.13 0.10 0.11 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08
20 Inventor-LM 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.00
21 Inventor-PA 0.12 0.32 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.10
22 LM-PA 0.30 0.46 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.03
23 Inventor-LM-PA 0.46 0.50 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.11
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
12 Inventions forward citations 0.31
13 Patent-not-granted -0.68 -0.45
14 Commercial potential 0.16 0.06 -0.14
15 Filing-to-allowance 0.21 0.11 -0.30 0.06
16 Post-allowance -0.10 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.50
17 Inventor's buyer-side contact -0.07 -0.06 0.11 -0.07 -0.02 0.00
18 LM's buyer-side contact 0.03 -0.24 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.01
19 PA's buyer-side contact -0.05 -0.23 0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.15
20 Inventor-LM 0.11 -0.02 -0.17 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.14 0.04
21 Inventor-PA 0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.35
22 LM-PA 0.12 0.05 -0.14 0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.08 -0.05 0.29 0.46
23 Inventor-LM-PA 0.13 0.03 -0.17 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.55 0.79 0.52
LM: Licensing manager, PA: Patent agent
Correlation coefficients greater than .05 or less than -0.05 are significant at the 5% level.
Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship 
44 
 
 
Table 2: Cox Regression of Licensing an Invention by Prior Relationship 
Inventor-intermediaries  Hazard of licensing 
No prior tie 1 
(n=392) 
Prior tie 1.80*** 
(n=527) 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
                               Prior tie: Prior relationship of the inventor, licensing manager, and patent agent 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Cox Regression of Licensing an Invention by Prior Relationship and Prior Invention’s 
Performance 
Prior invention No prior tie Prior tie 
Prior invention not licensed 1 
(n=280) 
1.25** 
(n=406) 
Prior invention licensed 1.09 
(n=112) 
4.49*** 
(n=121) 
    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Prior tie: Prior relationship of the inventor, licensing manager, and patent agent 
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 Table 4. Matched and Full Sample Cox Regression of Invention Licensing (Test H1, H2a, and H2b) 
  Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Matched Matched 
                          M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Disclosure year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technological domain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inventor dummies   Yes   Yes   
LM dummies    Yes  Yes   
PA dummies     Yes Yes   
# of inventors                    -0.024    -0.019     0.158***   0.079**    0.025     0.143**    0.094     0.095   
                           (0.039)    (0.038)    (0.052)    (0.038)    (0.042)    (0.060)    (0.061)    (0.060)   
Inventor # of inventions                   0.022***   0.020***  -0.028**    0.001     0.006    -0.014     0.013     0.010   
                           (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.013)    (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.016)    (0.018)    (0.017)   
LM # of inventions                  -0.002    -0.002     0.005**    0.014***  -0.002     0.003    -0.004*   -0.004*  
                           (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.002)    (0.006)    (0.002)    (0.002)   
PA # of patents                     0.000*    0.000*   -0.000    -0.000     0.000    -0.001     0.000     0.000   
                           (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Prior licensing success                     0.676***   0.662***   0.211     0.482***   0.545***   0.320*    0.564***   0.545*** 
                           (0.111)    (0.110)    (0.142)    (0.105)    (0.125)    (0.168)    (0.167)    (0.165)   
# of patent class                   -0.034    -0.029     0.115    -0.013     0.020    -0.066     0.145     0.162   
                           (0.103)    (0.101)    (0.124)    (0.097)    (0.118)    (0.158)    (0.128)    (0.127)   
# of claims                       0.002     0.003     0.002    -0.001     0.004     0.000    -0.002    -0.001   
                           (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
# of prior cites                    0.012*    0.013**    0.008     0.008     0.010     0.000     0.003     0.004   
                           (0.007)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.009)    (0.010)    (0.010)   
Generality                      -0.017    -0.003    -0.123     0.179     0.316     0.173    -0.419    -0.358   
                           (0.231)    (0.228)    (0.257)    (0.225)    (0.246)    (0.300)    (0.321)    (0.319)   
Originality                      -0.057    -0.050     0.150     0.226     0.222     0.414*    0.667**    0.644**  
                           (0.180)    (0.182)    (0.208)    (0.182)    (0.213)    (0.246)    (0.293)    (0.297)   
Inventions forward citations              0.157***   0.158***   0.096     0.235***   0.207***   0.257***   0.110     0.108   
                           (0.050)    (0.050)    (0.066)    (0.051)    (0.060)    (0.080)    (0.068)    (0.068)   
Patent-not-granted                  -0.777***  -0.726***  -0.724**   -0.385    -0.505*   -0.558    -0.711**   -0.677**  
                           (0.240)    (0.242)    (0.309)    (0.252)    (0.275)    (0.403)    (0.325)    (0.330)   
Commercial potential                 -0.017    -0.007     0.166**    0.093     0.010     0.214**    0.099     0.095   
                           (0.061)    (0.063)    (0.085)    (0.064)    (0.074)    (0.098)    (0.100)    (0.101)   
Filing-to-allowanceϮ                   0.109     0.765***   0.726***   0.701***   0.610**    0.851***   0.098     0.595**  
                           (0.124)    (0.209)    (0.261)    (0.205)    (0.242)    (0.286)    (0.194)    (0.269)   
Postallowance                    -0.047     0.531**    0.382     0.466*    0.627**    0.918**    0.023     0.546*  
                           (0.198)    (0.261)    (0.317)    (0.265)    (0.291)    (0.363)    (0.280)    (0.326)   
Inventor-LM                       0.404***   0.397***   0.548***   0.187     0.342*   -0.300     0.286     0.275   
                           (0.147)    (0.153)    (0.204)    (0.155)    (0.191)    (0.314)    (0.177)    (0.184)   
Inventor-PA                       0.093     0.111     0.313     0.070     0.356     0.025     0.145     0.134   
                           (0.177)    (0.184)    (0.272)    (0.208)    (0.226)    (0.366)    (0.214)    (0.222)   
LM-PA                         -0.387***  -0.369**   -0.900***  -0.611***  -0.158    -1.037***  -0.428**   -0.411**  
                           (0.144)    (0.149)    (0.202)    (0.148)    (0.208)    (0.351)    (0.167)    (0.171)   
Inventor-LM-PAŦ (H1)                    0.395**    1.086***   0.920**    0.812***   1.122***   1.589***   0.173     0.973*** 
                           (0.189)    (0.266)    (0.376)    (0.282)    (0.340)    (0.498)    (0.248)    (0.346)   
Inventor-LM-PA *          -0.982***  -0.887***  -0.811***  -0.943***  -1.044***         -0.961*** 
             Filing-to-allowance (H2a)               (0.226)    (0.286)    (0.229)    (0.264)    (0.318)           (0.309)   
Inventor-LM-PA *             -0.916***  -0.712**   -0.676**   -1.109***  -1.237***         -1.082*** 
             Postallowance (H2b)                         (0.256)    (0.322)    (0.266)    (0.298)    (0.393)           (0.342)   
Number of inventions                      919   919   919   919   919   919   511   511 
Log likelihood -3583.79   -3573.00   -3306.53   -3426.30   -3403.35   -3283.65   -1699.78   -1693.74   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.          
Significance tests are two tailed: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01       
Ϯ Omitted category is prefiling period 
Ŧ Comparison category is no prior relationship among all three (Inventor-LM-PA) 
LM: Licensing manager, PA: Patent agent 
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Table 5. Matched Sample Cox Regression of Invention Licensing (Test H3)  
  Full Sample Matched 
                             M1      M2   
Disclosure year Yes Yes 
Technological domain fixed effects Yes Yes 
# of inventors                     0.009     0.096   
                           (0.039)    (0.061)   
Inventor # of inventions                   0.015***   0.006   
                           (0.004)    (0.018)   
LM # of inventions                   0.001    -0.004   
                           (0.002)    (0.003)   
PA # of patents                    -0.000     0.001   
                           (0.000)    (0.001)   
Prior licensing success   0.503***   0.520*** 
                           (0.110)    (0.163)   
# of patent class                    0.008     0.150   
                           (0.092)    (0.125)   
# of claims                       0.001    -0.002   
                           (0.002)    (0.003)   
# of prior cites                    0.012**    0.001   
                           (0.005)    (0.010)   
Generality                       0.050    -0.385   
                           (0.225)    (0.324)   
Originality                      -0.032     0.666**  
                           (0.182)    (0.289)   
Inventions forward citations              0.152***   0.114*  
                           (0.049)    (0.068)   
Patent-not-granted                  -0.628**   -0.636*  
                           (0.245)    (0.335)   
Commercial potential                  0.025     0.089   
                           (0.063)    (0.106)   
Filing-to-allowance Ϯ                   0.702***   0.646**  
                           (0.213)    (0.280)   
Postallowance                     0.393     0.542   
                           (0.264)    (0.337)   
Inventor-LM                       0.267*    0.221   
                           (0.155)    (0.182)   
Inventor-PA                       0.079     0.167   
                           (0.184)    (0.222)   
LM-PA                         -0.374**   -0.424**  
                           (0.146)    (0.170)   
Inventor-LM-PA Ŧ (H1)                   1.482***   1.266*** 
                           (0.326)    (0.422)   
Inventor-LM-PA * Filing-to-allowance (H2a)         -0.929***  -1.027*** 
                           (0.236)    (0.323)   
Inventor-LM-PA * Postallowance (H2b)            -0.804***  -1.067*** 
                           (0.267)    (0.360)   
Inventor’s buyer-side contact                 0.002**    0.005   
                           (0.001)    (0.010)   
LM’s buyer-side contact                    0.000     0.003   
                           (0.002)    (0.002)   
PA’s buyer-side contact                    0.006***   0.004   
                           (0.002)    (0.003)   
Inventor-LM-PA * Inventor’s buyer-side contact (H3) 
H((H3)       
 -0.005*   -0.012   
                           (0.003)    (0.011)   
Inventor-LM-PA * LM’s buyer-side contact (H3)           -0.007***  -0.006*  
                           (0.002)    (0.003)   
Inventor-LM-PA * PA’s buyer-side contact            0.001     0.008*  
                           (0.002)    (0.004)   
Number of inventions      919     511   
Log likelihood -3543.31   -1685.70   
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
Significance tests are two tailed: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01 
LM: Licensing manager, PA: Patent agent 
Ϯ Omitted category is prefiling period 
Ŧ Comparison category is no prior relationship among all three (Inventor-LM-PA) 
1)  
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Figure 4: Relative Hazard of Licensing by IP Regime Changes and Prior Ties 
 
  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Pre-filing Filing-to-allowance Post-allowance
R
el
at
iv
e 
H
az
ar
d
 R
at
io
 o
f 
Li
ce
n
si
n
g
Prior ties No ties
Inventor-Intermediaries Relationship 
48 
 
 
 
Table 6. Cox Regression of Invention Licensing by Key Variables 
 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Disclosure year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technological domain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dyad relationships 
(Inventor-LM, Inventor-
PA, LM-PA) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Inventor-LM-PA Ŧ 0.399** 0.430** 1.214*** 1.011*** 1.762*** 
 (0.165) (0.167) (0.223) (0.197) (0.252) 
Filing-to-allowance Ϯ  0.075 0.875*** 0.074 0.852*** 
  (0.125) (0.212) (0.123) (0.209) 
Postallowance  -0.520*** 0.117 -0.507*** 0.101 
  (0.172) (0.237) (0.174) (0.237) 
Inventor’s buyer-side contact  -0.001 -0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
LM’s buyer-side contact  -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Inventor-LM-PA *     -1.179***  -1.151*** 
     Filing-to-allowance   (0.226)  (0.225) 
Inventor-LM-PA *      -0.961***  -0.914*** 
     Postallowance   (0.251)  (0.253) 
Inventor-LM-PA *    
     Inventor’s buyer-side contact 
   -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
Inventor-LM-PA *       -0.012*** -0.011*** 
     LM’s buyer-side contact    (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of inventions 919 919 919 919 919 
Log likelihood -3676.76 -3655.45 -3640.13 -3635.70 -3621.29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance tests are two tailed: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01 
LM: Licensing manager, PA: Patent agent 
Ϯ Omitted category is prefiling period 
Ŧ Comparison category is no prior relationship among all three (Inventor-LM-PA) 
 
L 
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Table 7: Robustness Analysis of the Substitution of the Inventor-Intermediaries Triadic 
Relationship by the Inventor-Licensee Dyadic Relationship Using a Subsample of Licensed 
Inventions  
  Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Matched Matched Matched 
                             M1      M2      M3      M4      M5      M6   
Disclosure year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technological domain fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of inventors                     0.034     0.029     0.035     0.077     0.070     0.088   
                           (0.041)    (0.041)    (0.041)    (0.065)    (0.065)    (0.066)   
Inventor # of inventions                   0.013***   0.013***   0.013***   0.030     0.028     0.027   
                           (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.025)   
LM # of inventions                  -0.002    -0.002    -0.002    -0.005**   -0.005**   -0.005**  
                           (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)   
PA # of patents                     0.000     0.000     0.000    -0.000    -0.000    -0.000   
                           (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Prior licensing success   0.652***   0.665***   0.662***   0.498***   0.515***   0.512*** 
                           (0.110)    (0.111)    (0.108)    (0.167)    (0.165)    (0.164)   
# of patent class                    0.042     0.040     0.031     0.105     0.115     0.088   
                           (0.100)    (0.099)    (0.100)    (0.136)    (0.135)    (0.137)   
# of claims                       0.003*    0.003*    0.004*   -0.002    -0.002    -0.001   
                           (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
# of prior cites                    0.007     0.007     0.007     0.016*    0.016*    0.017**  
                           (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)   
Generality                      -0.345    -0.320    -0.338    -0.727**   -0.669**   -0.739**  
                           (0.227)    (0.230)    (0.227)    (0.298)    (0.304)    (0.297)   
Originality                      -0.148    -0.154    -0.148     0.279     0.265     0.282   
                           (0.180)    (0.179)    (0.178)    (0.275)    (0.275)    (0.273)   
Inventions forward citations              0.032     0.026     0.032     0.077     0.061     0.072   
                           (0.052)    (0.051)    (0.052)    (0.071)    (0.071)    (0.071)   
Patent-not-granted                   0.033     0.036     0.043    -0.095    -0.059    -0.103   
                           (0.251)    (0.254)    (0.249)    (0.350)    (0.358)    (0.351)   
Commercial potential                 -0.187***  -0.176***  -0.182***  -0.200**   -0.185**   -0.185**  
                           (0.060)    (0.061)    (0.061)    (0.083)    (0.083)    (0.084)   
Filing-to-allowance Ϯ                   0.124     0.117     0.181     0.155     0.141     0.348   
                           (0.128)    (0.128)    (0.139)    (0.196)    (0.195)    (0.241)   
Postallowance                     0.170     0.163     0.275     0.306     0.288     0.588**  
                           (0.180)    (0.181)    (0.192)    (0.251)    (0.252)    (0.298)   
Inventor-LM                       0.200     0.194     0.183     0.278     0.256     0.222   
                           (0.149)    (0.148)    (0.149)    (0.187)    (0.186)    (0.189)   
Inventor-PA                       0.072     0.058     0.065    -0.094    -0.110    -0.106   
                           (0.179)    (0.179)    (0.180)    (0.249)    (0.250)    (0.253)   
LM-PA                         -0.190    -0.185    -0.197    -0.346**   -0.324*   -0.357**  
                           (0.137)    (0.136)    (0.137)    (0.175)    (0.175)    (0.177)   
Inventor-LM-PA Ŧ                     0.448**    0.385*    0.465**    0.611**    0.536*    0.655**  
                           (0.198)    (0.208)    (0.199)    (0.277)    (0.287)    (0.284)   
Repeated licensee                    0.300***   0.157     0.453***   0.665***   0.497**    1.041*** 
                           (0.109)    (0.150)    (0.164)    (0.141)    (0.198)    (0.265)   
Inventor-LM-PA * Repeated licensee                  0.263                   0.333          
                                  (0.216)                  (0.298)          
Filing-to-allowance * Repeated licensee                      -0.174                  -0.406   
                                         (0.222)                  (0.317)   
Postallowance * Repeated licensee                        -0.366                  -0.758**  
                                         (0.243)                  (0.344)   
Number of inventions      587     587   587    303      303      303   
Log likelihood -3064.68   -3063.99   -3063.73   -1382.03   -1381.44   -1380.10   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance tests are two tailed: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01 
LM: Licensing manager, PA: Patent agent 
Ϯ Omitted category is prefiling period 
Ŧ Comparison category is no prior relationship among all three (Inventor-LM-PA)  
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Table 8: Matched Sample Cox Regression of Invention Licensing with Continuous Prior Tie Measure (Test 
H1, H2a, H2b, H3) 
 Matched Matched Matched Matched 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 
     
(Control variables included)     
Commercial potential                  0.090     0.098     0.097     0.275**  
                           (0.101)    (0.102)    (0.104)    (0.114)   
Filing-to-allowance Ϯ                 0.103     0.317     0.161     0.317   
                           (0.193)    (0.216)    (0.195)    (0.225)   
Postallowance                     0.031     0.233     0.071     0.227   
                           (0.280)    (0.295)    (0.283)    (0.300)   
Inventor-LM                       0.315*    0.319*    0.260     0.269   
                           (0.169)    (0.170)    (0.168)    (0.169)   
Inventor-PA                       0.143     0.193     0.160     0.225   
                           (0.168)    (0.171)    (0.172)    (0.168)   
LM-PA                         -0.406***  -0.384**   -0.410***  -0.445*** 
                           (0.157)    (0.159)    (0.156)    (0.158)   
Inventor-LM-PA (count)                  0.068     0.159***   0.184***   0.482*** 
                           (0.047)    (0.043)    (0.053)    (0.084)   
Inventor-LM-PA (count) * Filing-to-Allowance             -0.172**          -0.150**  
                                  (0.075)           (0.070)   
Inventor-LM-PA (count) * Postallowance              -0.167*          -0.138   
                                  (0.093)           (0.093)   
Inventor-LM-PA (count) * Commercial potential                          -0.163*** 
                                                (0.035)   
Inventor’s buyer-side contact                               0.004    -0.000   
                                         (0.009)    (0.010)   
LM’s buyer-side contact                                  0.002     0.002   
                                         (0.002)    (0.002)   
PA’s buyer-side contact                                  0.005*    0.005**  
                                         (0.003)    (0.003)   
Inventor-LM-PA (count) * Inventor’s buyer-side contact                  -0.010    -0.004   
                                         (0.011)    (0.011)   
Inventor-LM-PA (count) * LM’s buyer-side contact                     -0.002**   -0.002*** 
                                         (0.001)    (0.001)   
Inventor-LM-PA (count) * PA’s buyer-side contact                      0.002*    0.002*  
                                         (0.001)    (0.001)   
Number of inventions                      511     511     511     511 
Log likelihood -1698.49   -1695.27   -1688.74   -1680.08   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance tests are two tailed: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01 
  Ϯ Omitted category is prefiling period 
  LM: Licensing manager, PA: Patent agent 
 
 
 
